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In response to state laws and federal incen-
tives, cities and metropolitan areas across the 
country are engaged in “sustainability planning” 
aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In 
many if not most cases, this planning seeks to 
reshape urban areas to reduce the amount of 
driving people do. In general, this means increas-
ing urban population densities and in particular 
replacing low-density neighborhoods in transit 
corridors with dense, mixed-use developments.
Such planning tramples on property rights 
and personal preferences. To increase urban area 
densities, planners use containment policies 
such as urban-growth boundaries or greenbelts. 
Owners of land outside these boundaries are re-
stricted from developing their land. Inside the 
boundaries, housing prices rise, making home-
ownership in general, and single-family homes 
in particular, unaffordable to large numbers of 
people.
Surveys show that people of all age groups as-
pire to own and live in a single-family home with 
a yard. Yet planners in Portland, San Francisco, 
and other urban areas seek to reduce the share of 
households living in single-family homes to well 
below 50 percent. They are doing this by restrict-
ing the construction of single-family homes 
while subsidizing multifamily housing.
To make matters worse, these policies are 
simply not effective at reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions. Plan Bay Area, a plan recently 
approved for the nine-county San Francisco– 
Oakland–San Jose metropolitan area, propos-
es to spend $14 billion in subsidies for high- 
density housing and $5 billion in subsidies for 
rail transit. Yet the combined effect of these sub-
sidies will be to reduce the region’s greenhouse 
gas emissions by less than 2 percent, at a cost 
of nearly $1,200 per ton of abated emissions. By 
contrast, a separate “climate initiative” program 
for the region includes projects such as car shar-
ing, van pooling, and incentives for people to 
buy more fuel-efficient cars. It is expected to re-
duce the region’s emissions by nearly 3 percent, 
at a cost of just $22 per ton of abated emissions. 
Planners are undiscouraged by the waste-
fulness of their density-and-transit programs. 
Laws passed in California, Florida, Oregon, and 
Washington require cities to implement such 
programs no matter how costly, and the Obama 
administration is offering cities in other states 
grants to encourage them to write such plans as 
well. These plans should be abandoned because 
they intrude on property rights and personal 
housing preferences and are cost-ineffective at 
saving energy and reducing emissions. 
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Introduction
On July 18, 2013, the Association of Bay 
Area Governments and the San Francisco 
Metropolitan Transportation Commission 
jointly approved Plan Bay Area. This plan at-
tempts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
by mandating a 30 percent increase in popu-
lation density for urbanized portions of the 
nine-county region and putting 80 percent 
of new housing and 66 percent of new jobs 
in high-density, mixed-use developments lo-
cated along transit corridors.1
If fully implemented, the plan will reduce 
the share of households living in single- 
family homes from 56 percent to no more, 
and possibly much less, than 48 percent. 
Meanwhile, the plan makes the vast major-
ity of private land in the region, including 
some areas that were previously open for 
development, off-limits to development 
without providing any compensation to the 
landowners.
In one sense, Plan Bay Area is just an in-
cremental tightening of the already draco-
nian land-use regulations that plague much 
of California. But Plan Bay Area and simi-
lar plans for other California metropolitan 
areas also set a precedent for cities across 
the country that want to regulate land use, 
housing, and transportation as a way of re-
ducing greenhouse gas emissions—or, alter-
natively, to use climate change as an excuse 
for regulating land use, housing, and trans-
portation. 
Indeed, the latest urban planning fad, 
often called sustainability or climate action 
planning, is taking place in cities and metro-
politan areas throughout the nation. Sup-
posedly, such planning aims at reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. Yet the plans do 
the same things—increase urban densities 
and attempt to discourage driving—that ur-
ban planners have been trying to do for de-
cades under very different pretenses.
In some places, these plans are driven 
by state laws. California, Washington, and 
Florida all passed laws in 2008 aimed at re-
ducing driving through land-use planning. 
For states that have not passed such laws, 
the Obama administration is “encouraging” 
metropolitan planners to include land-use 
regulation in their transportation plans and 
to focus that regulation on reducing green-
house gas emissions. This encouragement 
comes in the form of grants, both for plan-
ning and for construction of transportation 
facilities for alternative modes of travel such 
as streetcars or bicycles.
Sustainability planning imposes high 
costs on urban areas and their residents. 
Housing prices increase, and people lose 
their freedom of choice over the kind of 
housing they live in. Costs rise as well for 
other businesses, including retail, industri-
al, office, or any business that requires land. 
Congestion increases—one of the tactics for 
getting people to drive less—wasting peo-
ple’s time and fuel. 
Yet despite these high costs, land-use 
regulation has at best negligible effects on 
greenhouse gas emissions. Optimistic as-
sumptions built into planning models for 
Plan Bay Area predict that the land-use and 
transit aspects of the plan will reduce emis-
sions just 2.6 percent. More realistic assess-
ments suggest that the actual reduction will 
be close to zero.
The History of  
Sustainability Planning
The notion that central planners could 
reduce energy consumption in urban areas 
by increasing population densities was pro-
posed in a 1973 book titled Compact City: A 
Plan for a Livable Urban Environment. The book 
claimed that higher-density cities would re-
duce housing and transportation costs by 25 
percent “and would result in superior hous-
ing and superior transportation.”2
Among the many other benefits that the 
book claimed for higher-density cities was 
energy conservation. “In Compact City use 
of petroleum in autos and trucks would, of 
course, be dramatically reduced. So would di-
rect use of petroleum for heating. . . . Overall, 
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there appears to be a reduction of energy use 
of at least 15 percent.”3 This number, along 
with most others in the book, was based on 
crude, hypothetical projections and not on 
any actual measurements.
The book noted that burning of fossil fu-
els could introduce too much carbon dioxide 
into the atmosphere, which “could affect the 
polar icecaps” and “influence the world heat 
levels enough to affect the climate and eco-
systems noticeably.”4 However, the authors 
gave this problem less consideration than 
such things as the collection of solid waste 
and recycling or “mass horizontal transpor-
tation” (meaning some form of rail transit).
Though energy considerations were only 
a minor part of the book, the oil shortages 
of the 1970s brought this concept to the at-
tention of a few members of Congress. In 
1979, the House held a hearing on “Com-
pact Cities: A Neglected Way of Conserving 
Energy.”5 Nearly all witnesses at the hearing 
agreed that urban sprawl wasted energy as 
well as increased housing and urban service 
costs, though none offered any evidence or 
support for these claims. 
The hearing was led off by testimony 
from Oregon governor Tom McCall and 
Boulder, Colorado, mayor Ruth Correll as 
representatives of two areas that had suppos-
edly “tamed” sprawl. Under McCall, Oregon 
had passed a land-use law requiring all cities 
to draw urban-growth boundaries, outside 
of which development would be limited. 
Boulder had similarly limited expansion by 
purchasing land around the city to form a 
greenbelt. However, these policies were too 
new for either elected official to be able to 
show that they had saved any energy.
The implicit assumptions behind the 
claim that density saved energy were that 
people living in denser cities would drive 
less and use transit more; and when they did 
drive, they would drive shorter distances be-
cause everything would be closer together. A 
1977 book, Public Transportation and Land Use 
Policy, compared the population densities 
of various cities in history with the domi-
nant forms of transport in those cities. Eu-
ropean cities in 1938, for example, typically 
had densities of 25,000 to 90,000 people per 
square mile and were dominated by mass 
transit. By comparison, American cities of 
the 1960s, where auto use was predominant, 
had densities of only about 3,000 to 9,000 
people per square mile.6
Similarly, a 1989 study by urban planners 
Peter Newman and Jeffrey Kenworthy com-
pared gasoline consumption in 10 American 
cities and concluded that the denser cities 
used less gasoline per capita.7 Studies such 
as these led urban planners to conclude that 
there was a “land use–transportation con-
nection” that allowed them to influence peo-
ple’s transportation choices by manipulating 
land uses. Higher densities would mean more 
transit and less driving. A further implicit as-
sumption was that transit saved energy, even 
though most urban transit was in the form 
of diesel-powered buses that, on average, use 
far more energy per passenger mile than cars. 
While diesel may be more fuel efficient, that 
efficiency is lost when running buses that are 
so often empty or far under capacity.8 
These ideas contributed to a movement 
among architects and planners known as 
“New Urbanism.” A 1991 statement defin-
ing New Urbanism declared that all com-
munities should be designed “so that hous-
ing, jobs, daily needs and other activities are 
within easy walking distance of each other” 
as well as “within easy walking distance of 
transit stops.”9
New Urbanism consciously attempted 
to emulate cities as they were designed be-
fore automobiles. For New Urban architect 
Andres Duany, the ideal models were the 
“streetcar cities” built in the early part of 
the 20th century: multifamily dwellings and 
houses on small lots all within walking dis-
tance of small grocery stores and other busi-
nesses. “Urban planning reached a level of 
competence in the 1920s that was absolutely 
mind-boggling,” says Duany.10 
These ideas were incorporated into a 
“land use transportation air quality” (LU-
TRAQ) study commissioned by the planning 
advocacy group 1000 Friends of Oregon. Or-
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egon required cities to expand urban-growth 
boundaries to maintain a 20-year supply of 
developable land. But LUTRAQ proposed 
instead to rezone areas within the bound-
aries for higher-density, mixed-use devel-
opments, which the plan called “transit- 
oriented developments,” arguing that this 
would lead to less driving and less need to 
build more roads.11
By the time climate change became a 
major issue in the early 1990s, the notion 
that dense cities used less fossil fuels, and 
therefore emitted less greenhouse gases, 
was deeply ingrained in the urban planning 
profession. However, when government offi-
cials met in Rio de Janerio in 1992 to discuss 
climate issues, they included only a few lines 
related to urban planning in their 350-page 
“Agenda 21.” The paper urged countries to 
take “a comprehensive approach to urban-
transport planning and management” and:
a. Integrate land-use and transportation 
planning to encourage development 
patterns that reduce transport de-
mand; 
b. Adopt urban-transport programmes fa-
vouring high-occupancy public trans-
port in countries, as appropriate; 
c. Encourage non-motorized modes of 
transport by providing safe cycleways 
and footways in urban and suburban 
centres in countries, as appropriate.12 
Note that the first statement is vague, 
and did not specifically mention density, 
while the other two are qualified with “as 
appropriates.” To urban planners, “integrat-
ing land-use and transportation planning to 
reduce transport demand” implied promot-
ing dense, mixed-use developments. Howev-
er, soon after the Rio meeting, a number of 
economists and planners began questioning 
the assumptions behind this proposal.
One of the first challenges came from 
University of Southern California planning 
professor Genevieve Giuliano, who noted in 
1995 that LUTRAQ numbers projected that 
transit-oriented developments and other 
land-use changes actually had very little ef-
fect on people’s decisions whether to drive. 
Instead, the main effect the LUTRAQ study 
projected came from an assumption that 
all suburban employers (and, presumably, 
retailers) would charge their employees and 
customers for parking. “If the aim is to re-
duce environmental damage generated by 
automobiles, the effective remedy is to di-
rectly price and regulate autos and their use, 
not land use,” Giuliano concluded.13
Giuliano also noted that planners’ as-
sumptions that people want to live as close 
as possible to work were clearly false: in fact, 
people tended to put some distance between 
their homes and work, which suggested that 
efforts to move people closer would fail. 
Based on this and other evidence, Giuliano 
concluded that the land use–transportation 
connection was not as strong as most plan-
ners assumed. “Land use policies appear to 
have little impact on travel outcomes,” she 
wrote.14
Another 1995 challenge came from Brit-
ish geographer Michael Breheny. His analysis 
of data for British cities found that “energy 
savings from urban containment are likely 
to be disappointingly low. Indeed, even mod-
est savings could only be achieved through 
draconian policies of containment.” He sug-
gested “that the levels of energy savings likely 
to result from even quite tough compact-city 
proposals could be achieved in other, much 
simpler and relatively immediate ways” such 
as improved vehicle technology.15
In 1996, Marlon Boarnet, an urban plan-
ning professor at the University of Califor-
nia–Irvine, noted that “evidence on the link 
between land use and travel behavior is in-
conclusive.” He used travel diary data—actu-
al travel records collected from 769 South-
ern California residents—to compare travel 
with the land-use patterns in which each 
individual lived. He found that “the influ-
ence of land use variables is quite weak” and 
sometimes the opposite of what planners 
think. For example, people living within 
walking distance of retail centers actually 
drove more than those who did not.16 
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University of California–Irvine planning 
professor Randall Crane did a similar study 
using travel diaries collected from nearly 
7,500 people. In his 1998 paper he conclud-
ed that there is “little role for land use in ex-
plaining travel behavior.”17
In 1999, Jeffrey Kenworthy, one of the 
planners who claimed that denser American 
cities used less gasoline per capita than less-
dense ones, published a massive, 704-page 
book detailing 1960 through 1990 data for 
nearly four dozen urban areas around the 
world. His goal was to show that people in 
denser urban areas drove less. But his data 
also showed that, no matter how dense they 
were and no matter how much money cit-
ies put into urban transit, auto driving had 
increased and transit ridership had declined 
or, at best, was stagnant everywhere. He 
failed to find a single urban area that had re-
duced per-capita driving between 1960 and 
1990, much less one that reduced driving by 
increasing densities.18
Proponents of land-use regulation did 
many studies showing that people living in 
dense, mixed-use developments drove less 
than people in low-density suburbs.19 How-
ever, these studies rarely accounted for self-
selection—that is, that people who want to 
drive less tend to live in denser areas. This 
doesn’t mean that forcing people who prefer 
to drive to live in higher-density areas will 
significantly change their travel habits.
In 2008, University of California–Irvine 
economist David Brownstone reviewed 
the literature on relationships between ur-
ban form and driving at the request of the 
Transportation Research Board. He found 
that most studies failed to account for self-
selection, but those that did concluded that 
urban form had little influence on driving. 
While urban form did have a statistically 
measurable influence on driving, it was “too 
small to be useful” in saving energy or reduc-
ing greenhouse gas emissions.20
There is a connection between transporta-
tion and land use, but it is mostly a one-way 
street. Changing transportation technolo-
gies leads to changes in land uses. But rede-
signing cities to look the way they did before 
cars were dominant won’t make people for-
get about the advantages of convenient, low-
cost, door-to-door transportation. Planners 
who think this will work have a cargo-cult 
mentality; if high-density, mixed-use devel-
opments of the sort that were common in 
the early part of the 20th century could al-
low people to avoid driving, then cars would 
never have become popular.
California’s SB 375
Despite the growing literature showing 
that density and urban form have little ef-
fect on driving, in 2008 planning advocates 
persuaded the California legislature to im-
pose density mandates on metropolitan 
areas in an effort to reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions. “Greenhouse gas emissions from 
automobiles and light trucks can be sub-
stantially reduced by new vehicle technology 
and by the increased use of low carbon fuel,” 
says California Senate Bill 375. “However, 
even taking these measures into account, it 
will be necessary to achieve significant addi-
tional greenhouse gas reductions.”21 
The law set a target of reducing per capita 
automotive greenhouse gas emissions by 15 
percent and specified that metropolitan ar-
eas meet this target by increasing the share 
of housing in dense developments located 
along transit lines. The law also required 
planners to ensure that housing in Califor-
nia, which has some of the least affordable 
housing in the nation, is made more afford-
able.
Several other states passed laws in 2008 
aimed at reducing driving. Washington 
passed a law mandating a 50 percent reduc-
tion in per capita driving by 2050 and en-
couraging cities to use land-use regulation 
to achieve that target.22 Oregon has enacted 
similar, though somewhat less ambitious, 
targets through its Land Conservation and 
Development Commission. 
Florida passed a law in 2008 mandat-
ing “discouragement of urban sprawl” and 
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“energy-efficient land-use patterns” aimed 
at reducing energy consumption. The law 
specifies that metropolitan planners must 
“incorporate transportation strategies to 
address reduction in greenhouse gas emis-
sions from the transportation sector.”23
Plan Bay Area
While several metropolitan areas in Cali-
fornia have written plans under SB 375, Plan 
Bay Area is probably the most controversial 
and certainly provides a classic example of 
planners’ narrow vision overriding both re-
ality and cost-effectiveness. 
Prior to Plan Bay Area, most of the nine 
counties in the San Francisco Bay Area had 
drawn urban-growth boundaries outside 
of which development was strictly limited. 
For one reason or another, cities inside the 
boundaries also limited residential develop-
ment. In some cases, local residents opposed 
increased densities for their neighborhoods. 
But many city officials also believed that, 
under proposition 13—a property tax limita-
tion law passed by voters in 1978—residences 
paid less in property taxes to the cities than 
they cost the cities in urban services.24 
The result was a dramatic slowdown in 
the issuance of building permits in the 1970s. 
Where an average of 2.1 million housing per-
mits per year had been issued in the decade 
before proposition 13, only 1.1 million per-
mits per year were issued in the following 
two decades. Where the state’s population 
grew by 89 percent in the 20 years between 
1950 and 1970, it took another 42 years for 
the population to grow by the same amount.
This slowing of growth is not because 
people no longer wanted to live in Califor-
nia’s pleasant climate and dramatic scenery. 
Instead, the demand to live in California was 
expressed by growing housing prices. Where 
the state’s median home price in 1969 was 
about two times the median family income, 
by 2006 it was more than eight times the 
median family income. Someone can buy a 
home that costs twice their annual income 
and pay off the mortgage on the home in 
less than 10 years by dedicating a quarter 
of their income to the loan. But someone 
paying off a loan that is eight times their in-
come requires dedicating half their income 
to the loan for 30 years.
The authors of SB 375 were conscious of 
the state’s housing affordability problems, 
so in addition to reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions they required planners to ensure 
that each region had adequate housing to 
meet its needs. They apparently expected 
that the construction of large amounts of 
multifamily housing would make up for 
shortages in single-family housing.
Plan Bay Area predicted 30 percent popu-
lation growth by 2040, and the plan mandates 
that all of that growth take place within the 
existing “urban footprint,” meaning no new 
greenfield development will be allowed even 
though less than 18 percent of the region has 
been urbanized.25 Moreover, the plan identi-
fies scores of specific “priority development 
areas,” which are neighborhoods along major 
transit corridors that will be redeveloped into 
high-density, mixed-use districts, and directs 
that 80 percent of the population growth and 
more than 60 percent of new jobs be located 
in these areas.26
The priority development areas are sup-
posed to cover no more than 5 percent of 
the nine-county region. But the plan also 
says the existing urban footprint covers just 
17.8 percent of the region. Meeting Plan Bay 
Area’s goals therefore means redeveloping as 
much as 28 percent of all neighborhoods and 
business districts to higher densities. The re-
placement of single-family homes with mul-
tifamily housing combined with limits on 
the ability to build new single-family homes 
means that the region will probably have far 
fewer single-family homes than it has today.
Planners offered the public four alterna-
tives to Plan Bay Area. The “no project” al-
ternative was a true no-action alternative. 
Instead of just allowing present trends to 
continue, this alternative contemplated no 
new transportation facilities or other in-
frastructure to accommodate the popula-
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tion increase other than what has already 
been planned and budgeted for in the next 
five years. This alternative also allowed de-
velopment inside of existing urban-growth 
boundaries, which include a few undevel-
oped areas, instead of inside the tighter 
boundary of the existing urban footprint.
The other three alternatives all kept all 
development within the existing urban 
footprint. They differed only by which areas 
would be selected for densification and by 
transportation investments, primarily rail 
transit. Although the plan itself and three al-
ternatives called for increasing rail transit by 
more than the projected 30 percent increase 
in population, none of the alternatives al-
lowed either bus transit or highway facilities 
to keep up with population growth.27
Even as planners were writing Plan Bay 
Area, other California agencies were devel-
oping other programs to reduce the state’s 
greenhouse gas emissions. Before the Cali-
fornia legislature passed SB 375 in 2008, the 
legislature passed another law in 2006 that 
required the California Air Resources Board 
(ARB) to impose strict emissions standards 
on future cars, electrical generation plants, 
and other greenhouse gas emitters.28 This is 
known as the ARB Scoping Plan.29
The latest fuel economy standards adopt-
ed by the board in 2012 are identical to the 
Obama administration’s fuel economy stan-
dards, which require more than a doubling 
of the fuel economy of new cars by 2025.30 
However, Plan Bay Area did not include 
these new standards in its analysis, instead 
counting only the agency’s earlier standards, 
which required approximately a 30 percent 
increase in fuel economy by 2017.31
A second program was the Metropolitan 
Transportation Commission’s “climate pol-
icy initiative.” This consists of several differ-
ent projects, the most important of which 
are:
 ● Promotion of car sharing, which was 
projected to reduce greenhouse gases 
by 704 billion tons per year by 2040;
 ● Installing “smart driving” equipment—
essentially devices that report mo-
ment-to-moment fuel consumption 
to drivers in the hope that drivers will 
drive more carefully to save fuel—pro-
jected to reduce greenhouse gasses by 
385 billion tons per year by 2040;
 ● Incentives for people to buy electric 
and other clean vehicles, projected to 
save 385 billion tons per year by 2040;
 ● Vanpooling, projected to reduce green-
house gasses by 99 billion tons per 
year; and
 ● A commuter benefits program en-
couraging employers to give their em-
ployees incentives, such as free transit 
passes, to get to work without driving, 
which was projected to save 65 billion 
tons per year by 2040.
Planners estimate that the Bay Area pro-
duced about 48.8 million tons of greenhouse 
gas emissions (carbon dioxide equivalents) 
in 2010. Implementing Plan Bay Area, they 
predict, will reduce this by about 7.5 million 
tons, or 15.4 percent, by 2040. 
This is deceptive, however, as the Califor-
nia Air Resources Board Scoping Plan alone 
is responsible for more than 9.6 million tons 
of abated emissions (part of which is offset 
by increased population).32 The climate pol-
icy initiative reduces emissions by more than 
1.6 million tons.33 Meanwhile, the land-use 
and transit aspects of Plan Bay Area reduce 
emissions by less than 1.3 million tons.34 
Altogether then, the plan’s land-use and 
transportation changes, including transit-
oriented developments, reduce emissions by 
just 2.6 percent of 2010 emissions.35
Even this 2.6 percent is an overestimate 
because it fails to account for the latest fu-
el-economy standards. Implementation of 
those standards is likely to make the average 
car on the road more than 25 percent more 
fuel-efficient in 2040 than under the previ-
ous standards.36 This means the 5.6 per-
cent reduction in driving translates to just 
0.9 million tons of greenhouse gases, which 
is less than a 2.0 percent reduction in total 
2010 emissions.
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It is likely that even this 2.0 percent reduc-
tion is optimistic, as Plan Bay Area is merely 
a continuation of trends over the past three 
decades that have failed to reduce driving. 
Since 1980, the population density of the 
San Francisco–Oakland and San Jose urban-
ized areas have each grown by more than 55 
percent, and the region has built more than 
200 miles of new rail transit lines. Dozens of 
high-density developments have been built 
along transit lines in such places as Con-
cord, Fremont, Pleasant Hill, San Jose, and 
Walnut Creek. 
Contrary to the predictions of the authors 
of Compact City, this densification did not re-
sult in superior housing and transportation 
at 25 percent lower costs. Instead, housing 
costs dramatically increased, and the qual-
ity of housing most people could afford de-
clined. A 1,100-square-foot condominium in 
San Jose typically costs more than twice as 
much as a 2,200-square-foot single-family 
home on a large lot in lower-density urban 
areas such as Houston or Dallas. 
Nor is transportation better. According 
to INRIX, which measures actual traffic con-
gestion in urban areas throughout the na-
tion, traffic congestion in the San Francisco 
Bay Area wasted more time per driver—49 
hours per year—than almost any other met-
ropolitan area in the country. Only Los An-
geles, at 59 hours per year, was significantly 
worse, while New York and Honolulu, at 
50 hours per year, were slightly worse than 
San Francisco.37 At 6,999 people per square 
mile, Los Angeles is the only urban area that 
is significantly denser than San Francisco- 
Oakland’s 6,266, while densities in New 
York (5,319) and urban Honolulu (4,716) 
are also much higher than the national aver-
age for urban areas (2,526).38
According to the Texas Transportation 
Institute, which has been keeping track of 
congestion in major urban areas since 1982, 
the annual number of hours of time wasted 
per commuter in the San Francisco–Oakland 
area has increased by 154 percent since 1982, 
while the increase in the San Jose area was 
117 percent. The annual cost of congestion 
in these two urban areas is more than $4 bil-
lion, or close to $1,500 per commuter.39
Transportation in the San Francisco Bay 
Area is also more costly than in lower-density 
areas, partly because of the congestion and 
partly because of the region’s emphasis on 
high-cost rail transit. According to the Federal 
Transit Administration, total transit expenses 
in the San Francisco–Oakland area averaged 
99 cents per passenger mile in 2011, while in 
San Jose they averaged $1.88.40 By compari-
son, in 2011 Americans spent an average of 40 
cents per vehicle mile driving, including high-
way subsidies.41 With average occupancies of 
1.67 people per vehicle, driving costs just 24 
cents per passenger mile, so Bay Area transit is 
several times more expensive.42
Despite the densification and rail transit 
construction, per capita driving has increased 
and transit ridership has been stagnant. The 
earliest year for which per capita driving by 
urbanized area is available is 1989, when 
San Francisco–Oakland residents drove 21.5 
miles per day and San Jose residents drove 
23.1 miles per day.43 In the latest year, 2010, 
San Francisco–Oakland per capita driving 
had increased to 22.5 miles per day, and San 
Jose driving to 24.0 miles per day.44 Mean-
while, per capita transit trips declined from 
100 in trips per year in 1982 to 64 in 2011.45 
Over about the same time period, transit’s 
share of commuting dropped from 11.6 per-
cent in 1980 to 10.6 percent in 2010, while 
the share of commuters driving to work rose 
from 80.7 percent in 1980 to 82.1 percent in 
2010.46 
The failure of past densification, rail tran-
sit, and transit-oriented developments casts 
doubts on whether even the 2.0 percent re-
duction in greenhouse gas emissions pro-
jected by Plan Bay Area is realistic. Moreover, 
the high costs of the plan, including the sub-
sidies that will be needed to get developers 
to build high-density housing when most 
Americans prefer to live in single-family 
homes, cannot be justified by a mere 2.0 per-
cent decline in emissions.
For example, planners estimate that the 
climate policy initiatives that will reduce an-
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nual greenhouse gas emissions by 1.6 mil-
lion tons will cost the region $630 million. 
By contrast, Plan Bay Area’s land-use and 
transit plans that are expected to contrib-
ute to a 0.9-million ton reduction in annual 
emissions are expected to cost $19 billion.47 
That means the cost per ton of the land-use 
and transit program will be more than 50 
times greater than the cost of the climate 
policy initiatives.
If the capital costs are annualized at a 4 
percent interest rate over 30 years, then the 
cost per ton of the climate policy initiatives 
averages $22, well below the $50 per ton 
that McKinsey says is the threshold of cost- 
effectiveness (see page 11). But the cost per 
ton of Plan Bay Area’s land-use and transit 
plans is $1,175—more than 20 times greater 
than the $50 limit. This shows that the plan 
is not a cost-effective way of reducing green-
house gases.
These costs include only the costs to the 
various government agencies implementing 
the plans. One of the biggest hidden costs of 
the plan is its effect on housing affordability. 
The costs of land and of housing and other 
land uses all rise when regions constrain de-
velopment to limit urban expansion. Owing 
to previous plans and the resulting increases 
in land prices, California housing today is 
among the least affordable in the nation. 
Although SB 375 also directed metro-
politan areas to improve housing affordabil-
ity, denser development turns out to be the 
wrong way to achieve this. The planners who 
wrote Plan Bay Area found that low- and low-
er-middle-income residents currently spend 
66 percent of their incomes on transporta-
tion and housing, and they set a target of 
reducing this to 56 percent. Far from meet-
ing this target, however, the plan actually in-
creased it to 69 percent.48 Planners refused 
to even consider any alternatives that would 
allow expansion of the urban footprint in 
order to make housing more affordable.
One thing Plan Bay Area did not do to re-
duce greenhouse gas emissions was attempt 
to significantly reduce congestion below its 
current levels. In fact, Plan Bay Area projects 
that the amount of driving in severe conges-
tion (known to highway engineers as “level 
of service F”) will more than double by 2040. 
According to the Texas Transportation In-
stitute, traffic congestion in the San Fran-
cisco–Oakland and San Jose urban areas 
wasted nearly 85 million gallons of fuel in 
2012, leading to more than 0.7 million tons 
of greenhouse gas emissions.49 Since cars are 
expected to be, on average, about twice as 
fuel-efficient in 2040 as they are today, that 
means congestion-related emissions will still 
be more than 0.7 million tons, or nearly as 
much as the savings from the land-use and 
transit policies. It is likely that this conges-
tion could be reduced at a far lower cost than 
the implementation of the land-use policies.
My comments on the Plan Bay Area en-
vironmental impact report pointed out that 
the plan is not cost-effective and that it would 
make housing less affordable. In response, 
the agencies dodged the questions by saying 
that these are not “environmental issues to 
which a response is required under CEQA.”50 
In fact, the billions of dollars that Plan Bay 
Area proposes to spend on programs that re-
sult in negligible effects on greenhouse gas 
emissions are funds that could otherwise be 
spent on programs that could have far great-
er environmental benefits. Cost-effectiveness 
therefore is crucial when considering envi-
ronmental effects.
In short, Plan Bay Area disproved all of the 
assumptions made by SB 375. Improved fuel 
economy turns out to be the most effective 
way of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
Increased densities and transit-oriented de-
velopments are not just ineffective, they are 
extremely expensive. Moreover, one of those 
costs is a decline in housing affordability.
Plan Bay Area illustrates several of the 
problems fatal to all central planning. First, 
economic entities such as cities and urban 
areas are too complicated to plan, so plan-
ners oversimplify. Second, among those 
oversimplifications, planners become over-
ly focused on one or two goals rather than 
consider all economic values and trade-offs. 
Third, in attempting to achieve those goals, 
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Oversimplification
A United Nations commission wrote the 
most commonly cited definition of “sus-
tainable development” in 1987: “sustainable 
development is development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromis-
ing the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs.”51 Any true sustainability 
plan would have to consider a broad range 
of resources, including soils, water, air, wild-
life, fisheries, forests, energy, and minerals. A 
strict interpretation of the above definition 
would also have to take national finances 
into account, as a sustainability plan that is 
so expensive that left future generations in 
poverty would clearly compromise the abil-
ity of those generations to meet their needs.
A plan that takes into account all of 
these resources is simply too complicated 
to prepare. The production functions, cost 
functions, personal preferences for various 
resources, trade-offs, and other factors that 
must be taken into account are not only too 
numerous, they change from day to day, and 
the introduction of new technologies can 
dramatically alter them in unpredictable 
ways. Central plans simply cannot take these 
changes into account.
As a result, the so-called sustainability 
plans being written today consider only one 
thing: greenhouse gas emissions. While such 
emissions are something of a proxy for non-
renewable energy consumption, they are 
otherwise not related to any other resource. 
Plans that ignore other resources ignore the 
potential trade-offs between, say, efforts to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and water, 
wildlife, or other resources.
As if it isn’t enough to oversimplify the 
plans, planners also oversimplify reality. “If 
economic reality is so complex that it can only 
be described by complicated mathematical 
models,” says planning guru Herman Daly, 
“then the reality should be simplified.”52 
Such simplifications can be seen in land-use 
plans that attempt to pigeonhole the wide va-
riety of possible land uses into a few narrow 
categories, with anything not fitting into one 
of these categories rendered illegal.
In 1961, for example, Hawaii passed leg-
islation that placed all land uses into one of 
three categories: urban, rural, or agricultur-
al. Later, a conservation category was added. 
Any land that wasn’t placed in the urban 
category was off limits to development with-
out special dispensation from the state. This 
soon became highly politicized, as elected 
officials became essential partners in any de-
velopment projects outside of urban areas.
More recently, urban planners have de-
fined what they call the urban transect, which 
defines land uses in six categories: rural pre-
serve, rural reserve, edge residential, general 
residential, centers, and urban core.53 Rural 
preserves and reserves are effectively off-
limits to new development, and planners as-
sume that only people with genuine rural oc-
cupations should be allowed to live in them. 
For example, in 1995 an Oregon land-
use agency passed a rule preventing people 
from building homes in rural areas unless 
they were actual farmers and actually earned 
(depending on the soil productivity of their 
land) $40,000 to $80,000 a year in two of 
the last three years from farming. This rule 
was needed, said the agency, to prevent “law-
yers, doctors, and others not really farming 
[from] building houses in farm zones.”54
This narrow view effectively rules out 
major lifestyles such as exurbanites (people 
with urban occupations who choose to live 
and possibly work in rural areas) and urban 
farmers (people who grow agricultural crops 
for local consumption in areas that are oth-
erwise urbanized). Such oversimplification 
denies people’s individuality, personal pref-
erences, and consumer choices.
Narrow Goals
Having decided to focus on reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, urban planning 
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advocates then focus their goals even fur-
ther by aiming at per capita driving. One 
classic example of a focus on what may be 
the wrong priority is the 2008 Washington 
state law setting a target of “decreas[ing] the 
annual per capita vehicle miles traveled by 
fifty percent by 2050.”55 
In theory, there are three approaches to-
wards reducing emissions such as carbon 
dioxide. One is to argue that all emissions 
must be reduced, no matter what the cost. If 
the goal is to reduce emissions by 3 gigatons, 
and if someone can find a way to eliminate 1 
gigaton of emissions at a cost of $1 million a 
ton, then the total cost of that gigaton is $1 
quintillion, which is more than 14,000 years 
of the gross domestic product of the entire 
world. That’s clearly not affordable, so some 
decision must be made about which actions 
are worthwhile and which are not.
A second approach is to argue that, if the 
goal is to reduce emissions by half, then all 
existing producers must reduce their emis-
sions by half. The problem with this is that 
some producers may be able to reduce their 
emissions by far more than half at a very low 
cost, while others would have to spend far 
more to reduce their emissions by anything 
close to one half. It makes more sense to find 
the lowest cost or most cost-effective ways of 
reducing emissions.
The third approach, then, is to find cost-
effective means of reducing emissions. Car-
bon trading and carbon taxes are two ways 
of attempting to find the most cost-effective 
emissions reduction techniques. While there 
are arguments for and against each, advo-
cates of either tacitly admit that emissions 
should be reduced in a cost-effective manner. 
But if either of these systems were adopted, 
there would be no need for governments to 
engage in land-use regulation aimed at re-
ducing emissions, as land-use changes would 
take place if they were cost-effective, and if 
they were not cost-effective then govern-
ments shouldn’t try to impose them.
One writer recently argued that carbon 
taxes are a bad idea because a tax of $25 to 
$30 per ton—which, he said, is the typical 
range being considered—would only, by his 
calculations, reduce per capita driving by 
about 1 percent.56 But the goal of carbon 
taxes is not to reduce per capita driving; it is 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. If car-
bon taxes only reduce per capita driving by 
1 percent, it indicates that greater reductions 
in driving are not a cost-effective way of re-
ducing emissions.
Despite this, urban planners seem to 
be especially focused on reducing driving. 
Leaning on the second approach to reduc-
ing emissions, they often point to the share 
of emissions produced by transportation. 
“Transportation accounts for a full third of 
CO2 emissions in the United States,” says a 
report published by the Urban Land Insti-
tute.57 In fact, the actual share is closer to 27 
percent, and less than 17 percent of the total 
comes from cars and light-duty trucks, the 
only source addressed by many recent sus-
tainability plans.58
While 17 percent is still a substantial 
amount, that doesn’t automatically prove 
that reducing per capita driving is a cost-ef-
fective way of reducing emissions. It is quite 
possible that reducing emissions from other 
sources is more cost-effective than reduc-
ing emissions from driving, and it is further 
possible that reducing emissions per mile of 
driving is more cost-effective than reducing 
the number of miles driven.
A 2008 report from McKinsey & Com-
pany attempted to estimate the most cost- 
effective way of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions by more than 50 percent by 2030. 
The report found that this ambitious goal 
could be achieved by investing in programs 
and projects that cost less than $50 per ton 
of carbon dioxide-equivalent greenhouse 
gases abated. Many of these programs and 
projects, the report found, would actually 
save money in the long run (for example, 
the reduced costs of power to LED light-
ing would repay the costs of installing such 
lights), so that the overall net cost would 
be low. However, none of the practices that 
McKinsey considered to be cost-effective in-
cluded efforts to reduce per capita driving.59
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The main transport-related programs 
that McKinsey considered to be cost- 
effective involved improving the fuel econ-
omy of cars and trucks. President Obama’s 
fuel-economy standards, which require man-
ufacturers to increase their fleet-averages to 
54.5 miles per gallon by 2025, will reduce per-
mile emissions by nearly 30 percent by 2025 
and nearly 40 percent by 2030.60 Researchers 
at MIT believe manufacturers can easily meet 
these standards on a cost-effective basis with 
measures such as lighter-weight materials, 
like aluminum; improved auto designs, such 
as streamlining; and substituting diesel for 
gasoline engines.61 
Driving-related strategies not considered 
by McKinsey include efforts to reduce con-
gestion. Researchers at the University of Cal-
ifornia–Riverside estimate that congestion-
reduction strategies, such as variable-priced 
toll roads, could reduce fuel consumption 
and emissions by another 30 percent.62 
One strategy that these researchers did 
not consider was traffic signal coordina-
tion. More than a third of all driving takes 
place on urban roads with signalized inter-
sections.63 Adding or updating signal coor-
dination equipment could improve traffic 
flows at more than three-quarters of those 
intersections.64 Such improvements would 
reduce vehicle energy consumption by 3 to 
12 percent at a cost of $25 to $34 per ton of 
greenhouse gases abated.65 This cost doesn’t 
consider the savings to motorists in fuel and 
time, which effectively repay the costs of 
signal coordination in less than five years. 
Thus, the net benefits of signal coordina-
tion to society are positive without counting 
greenhouse gases.
In short, variable-priced roads, traffic sig-
nal coordination, and other congestion-re-
duction techniques combined with more fu-
el-efficient cars could reduce per mile vehicle 
emissions by well over 60 percent. Yet many 
planners are not enthused about signal coor-
dination or other measures to relieve conges-
tion because their goal is to reduce per capita 
driving, and they see increasing congestion 
as a means of achieving that goal. 
“Congestion is our friend,” says planner 
Dom Nozzi, and many other planners agree, 
their assumption being that forcing a few 
people out of their cars outweighs the costs 
of congestion to everyone else.66 Aside from 
numbers, the problem with this assumption 
is that congestion is a deadweight loss to 
society. In short, congestion imposes costs 
without generating benefits.
Unfortunately, politicians are also un-
enthused about, and in some cases wary of, 
measures that actually reduce congestion. 
Signal coordination is probably the most 
cost-effective way of relieving congestion, 
but it is practically invisible, so politicians 
who support it don’t get much credit for it 
among voters. Most economists agree that 
variable-priced toll roads can virtually solve 
most rush-hour congestion problems, but 
politicians fear imposing charges on users 
for things that were once “free.” In contrast, 
building a light-rail line is highly visible, and 
the few people who actually use the rail line 
are loudly enthusiastic in praising it, so the 
fact that it may actually increase congestion 
for everyone else is conveniently ignored.
In any case, planning advocates remain 
convinced that improving fuel economy, 
either by improving automobiles or roads, 
will be insufficient to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. “Technological improvements in 
vehicles and fuels are likely to be offset by 
continuing, robust growth in VMT” or ve-
hicle miles traveled, say planning advocates 
who focus on reducing driving.67 To the con-
trary, since the time they wrote this in 2008, 
analysts at the Congressional Budget Office 
have concluded that future VMT growth 
will be outweighed by future improvements 
in fuel economy, so that the total gallons 
of fuel consumed each year will decline by 
more than 20 percent by the year 2040.68
Even if it were true that VMT growth 
would outpace improvements in fuel econ-
omy, that doesn’t prove that attempting to 
reduce per capita driving is a cost-effective 
way of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
Yet planners managed to get this assump-
tion explicitly enshrined into the 2008 state 
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of Washington legislation, requiring not 
just a reduction in per capita greenhouse gas 
emissions, but a reduction in vehicle miles 
traveled. The law requires an 18 percent re-
duction by 2020; a 30 percent reduction by 
2035; and a 50 percent reduction by 2050. 
These targets are aimed solely at personal ve-
hicles; vehicles weighing more than 10,000 
pounds are exempt.69
Achieving such reductions will be quite 
costly. There are two main ways of reducing 
driving. One is to provide transit and other 
substitutes for driving. The other is to dis-
courage driving by making it more costly. 
Transit is far more expensive than driving; 
in 2011, American transit agencies spent an 
average of 92 cents per passenger mile.70 As 
previously noted, Americans spent 40 cents 
per vehicle mile driving in 2011, including 
highway subsidies.71 With average occupan-
cies of 1.67 people per vehicle, driving costs 
just 24 cents per passenger mile, so transit is 
nearly four times more expensive.72
Attempts to discourage driving can be 
even more costly because driving produces 
enormous benefits. Roads and streets go to 
far more places than public transportation, 
and driving is not only less expensive, it is 
faster and more convenient. Faster commute 
speeds offer employers a larger pool of work-
ers and thereby increase worker productiv-
ity.73 Driving also provides people access 
to lower-cost housing and other consumer 
goods. 
Most European nations have attempted 
to discourage driving through a combina-
tion of subsidies to transit and high taxes on 
motor fuels. These taxes have been success-
ful in the sense that the average European 
drives only about 63 percent as many miles 
per year as the average American. But public 
transport policies have been less successful 
in that total European travel is only 72 per-
cent of American travel per capita.74 By ef-
fectively suppressing total mobility, Europe-
an countries have sacrificed worker incomes 
and increased housing and other costs.
Even if public transit could act as a sub-
stitute for driving, it isn’t clear that transit 
emits significantly less greenhouse gases 
per passenger mile than autos. In 2011, the 
average car on the road went about 23.1 
miles per gallon and carried about 1.67 oc-
cupants.75 Since greenhouse gas emissions 
of gasoline-powered vehicles are exactly pro-
portional to the amount gasoline they use, 
this means the average car emitted about 
230 grams of carbon dioxide per passenger 
mile.76 By comparison, America’s transit 
systems emitted an average of 209 grams of 
carbon dioxide per passenger mile. But most 
transit systems actually did far worse; of the 
nation’s 100 largest urban areas, only tran-
sit in New York, Chicago, San Francisco– 
Oakland, Minneapolis–St. Paul, Las Vegas, 
Portland, New Orleans, Raleigh, and Hono-
lulu emitted significantly less greenhouse 
gases per passenger mile than cars.77 
Substituting Means  
for Ends
Planners think they have found a way to 
reduce per capita driving without sacrificing 
worker productivity or increasing consumer 
costs: They want to rebuild American cities 
so that people can do everything they want 
to do without driving as much. This means 
higher density cities (so people are closer to 
destinations), mixed uses (so residents can 
walk to shops and work), and a special em-
phasis on density and mixed uses along tran-
sit corridors or near transit stations (so more 
people can take transit to get to destinations 
that are further than walking distances).
There are two problems with this ap-
proach. First, it is extraordinarily expensive, 
partly because it goes against the preferenc-
es of the majority of Americans of all ages to 
live in single-family homes rather than mul-
tifamily housing. Second, its effects on per 
capita driving are questionable and likely to 
be quite minor. As David Brownstone’s 2008 
literature review noted, “the magnitude of 
the link between the built environment and 
VMT is so small that feasible changes in the 
built environment will only have negligible 
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impacts on VMT.” For example, one study 
he cites concluded that a 40 percent increase 
in density would reduce driving per house-
hold by 5 percent.78
After reviewing Brownstone’s paper and 
other research on the subject, a Transporta-
tion Research Board committee concluded, 
“The literature suggests that doubling resi-
dential density across a metropolitan area 
might lower household VMT by about 5 to 
12 percent, and perhaps by as much as 25 
percent, if coupled with higher employment 
concentrations, significant public transit 
improvements, mixed uses, and other sup-
portive demand management measures.”79 
A 25 percent reduction in driving may 
sound promising. But the conditions are 
both expensive and unlikely. Doubling a met-
ropolitan area’s residential density would be 
painful and expensive. The San Jose urban-
ized area doubled its density between 1960 
and 2000, but its median housing prices 
grew from about two times median fam-
ily incomes to more than five times median 
family incomes. At the end of that time pe-
riod, the region saw 23.6 miles of driving 
per capita each day, which is more than the 
national average for urbanized areas and far 
more than per capita driving in 1960.80 
Concentrating employment is even more 
difficult than doubling residential densities: 
factories, retail centers, and even offices in-
creasingly prefer to locate in uncongested, 
low-density areas. A Brookings Institution 
study found that the recent recession had 
the greatest impact on industries that were 
most decentralized, such as construction and 
manufacturing. Despite this impact, Ameri-
can jobs continued to decentralize during the 
first decade of the 21st century: only 9 of the 
100 largest metropolitan areas saw the share 
of jobs increase in the urban cores. 
San Jose was one of those nine. In fact, 
says the report, “San Jose registered as the 
most centralized metro area by far in 2010, 
with 64 percent of jobs located within three 
miles of CBDs in San Jose, Palo Alto, and 
Sunnyvale,” up from 62 percent in 2000.81 
Yet, despite the recession and the increase in 
San Jose’s job concentration, San Jose’s per 
capita driving grew to 24.0 miles per day in 
2010.82
Having gone from “sustainability” to “re-
ducing greenhouse gas emissions” to “reduc-
ing driving” to “increasing densities,” plan-
ners have removed themselves several steps 
away from the original problem. As a result, 
they end up adopting costly plans without 
ever asking whether those plans will achieve 
their ultimate objectives or do so on a cost-
effective basis. 
Plan Lafayette
Lafayette, Louisiana, is economically, so-
cially, and politically about as far from San 
Francisco as possible while still being in the 
United States. Yet Lafayette’s consolidated 
city-parish government, which serves about 
225,000 people, is developing a plan much 
like Plan Bay Area. The plan even has a simi-
lar name: Plan Lafayette.
Like Plan Bay Area, Plan Lafayette has a 
“no action” alternative that is truly no ac-
tion. Planners admit the alternative could 
not be implemented because it specifies no 
new infrastructure will be built in the re-
gion, which is obviously unrealistic in the 
face of population growth. The plan does 
not consider a “no change in current trends” 
alternative that would allow people to live 
where they want and build on their own 
land throughout the parish. 
The plan has three other alternatives. 
Like Plan Bay Area, all three alternatives vary 
only in which part of the city is to be densi-
fied.83 None of the alternatives contemplate 
allowing people to live where they want or 
to build on their own land if that land is 
outside an area designated by the plan for 
development.
Plan Bay Area has five alternatives, while 
Plan Lafayette has only four, but that’s prob-
ably because as of this writing Plan Lafayette 
is still in the “alternative analysis” stage of 
planning. It is likely that Lafayette planners 
will produce a preferred alternative in the 
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plan itself that can be compared with the 
four alternatives in the alternatives analysis. 
It is also likely that, as with Plan Bay Area, the 
preferred alternative will simply be another 
densification alternative, differing from the 
others only by which neighborhoods are to 
be densified.
The International Council 
for Local Environmental 
Initiatives
Why are plans from such disparate parts 
of the country so similar? One answer is that 
planners are learning from the same play-
book, and to a large degree that playbook is 
being provided by a group called Local Gov-
ernments for Sustainability. If there is an in-
ternational connection behind sustainability 
planning, it is not the United Nations but 
this group.
Until recently, Local Governments for Sus-
tainability was called the International Coun-
cil for Local Environmental Initiatives, and 
it still uses the acronym ICLEI. The group 
has offices in ten countries other than the 
United States. It claims that more than 1,200 
municipalities in 84 countries are members. 
In exchange for membership fees from local 
governments, ICLEI provides planning tools 
such as the Sustainability Planning Toolkit, a 
55-page document that offers step-by-step 
instructions for writing a sustainability or cli-
mate action plan.
In 2012, the United States’s office of ICLEI 
reported $4.1 million in 2011 revenues to the 
IRS. More than $1.4 million was in the form 
of government grants, while another $0.7 
million was membership fees from local gov-
ernments, and nearly $0.9 million was “fees 
for service contracts,” which mostly—if not 
entirely—came from government agencies. 
While ICLEI also received about $1.0 million 
in private grants and contributions, more 
than three-fourths of its budget ultimately 
came from tax dollars. Thus, taxpayers in cit-
ies across the country are effectively paying 
ICLEI to lobby their local governments to 
take actions that are not necessarily in their 
best interests.
The Sustainability Planning Toolkit dis-
tinguishes between sustainability plans that 
have a broad range of goals but include “an 
overarching goal to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions,” and climate action plans that focus 
primarily on reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions.84 By ICLEI’s count, as of the end of 
2009, 141 municipalities had written or were 
writing climate action plans while another 
56 had written or were writing sustainability 
plans. These range from the town of Chevy 
Chase, Maryland, which has a population 
of 3,000, to New York City, which has more 
than 8 million people.85 
Not all of the plans look alike, but many 
share an obsession with reducing driving 
and increasing densities, combined with a 
failure to evaluate whether such policies are 
either effective or cost-effective at reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. For example, the 
Sustainable Northhampton Plan uses trans-
ferable development rights to concentrate 
development in already dense areas.86 
The Sustainable Salt Lake City plan seeks 
to reduce total driving by 6.5 percent partly 
by extending light rail and subsidizing high-
density development in transit corridors.87 
Salt Lake City’s transit system uses more 
energy and emits more greenhouse gases 
per passenger mile than the average car, so 
reducing driving by increasing transit is not 
a good way to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions.88
Obama’s Sustainability 
“Partnership”
The Obama administration is also pro-
moting sustainability planning through a 
“partnership” of three departments: Trans-
portation, Housing and Urban Development, 
and the Environmental Protection Agency. 
Among the goals of this partnership are:
 ● “Provide more transportation choices,” 
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which means directing federal funds—
mostly from gasoline taxes and other 
highway user fees—to alternatives to 
the automobile such as transit or bike 
paths;
 ● “Promote equitable, affordable hous-
ing,” which means high-density hous-
ing, which is presumed to be more 
affordable than single-family homes; 
and
 ● “Support existing communities,” 
which means putting new develop-
ment, especially “transit-oriented, 
mixed-use development,” in already 
developed areas instead of in undevel-
oped areas at the urban fringe.89 
These ideas are promoted through feder-
al housing and transportation grants aimed 
at “integration of transportation, land use, 
and climate change.”90 In addition, the ad-
ministration wants metropolitan planning 
organizations to incorporate “land use 
changes, including land use mixing, pedes-
trian accessibility and friendliness, and in-
creased density,” in the long-range transpor-
tation plans that they are required to write 
every five years.91
Misinterpreting  
Housing Demand
Planners who seek to increase the share 
of households living in multifamily housing 
often claim that changing demographics 
are reducing the demand for single-family 
homes. Baby boomers supposedly want to 
move to high-density, inner-city neighbor-
hoods when their children leave home. Re-
cent articles in the Wall Street Journal and 
Washington Post claimed that a million baby 
boomers had moved to inner-city neigh-
borhoods between 2000 and 2010.92 Their 
grandchildren, meanwhile, are supposed to 
prefer vibrant mixed-use neighborhoods. 
One of the first to make these claims was 
University of Utah urban planning profes-
sor Arthur Nelson. In a 2006 article in the 
Journal of the American Planning Association, 
he predicted that by 2025 America would 
have a surplus of millions of single-family 
homes, and he argued that urban planners 
should take a leadership role by writing 
zoning codes and redevelopment plans to 
encourage developers to meet his projected 
demand for multifamily housing.93
In fact, Nelson’s claims are largely based 
on wishful thinking for two reasons. First, 
his entire argument comes down to a single 
table in his article that he admitted was 
based on his “interpretation” of published 
surveys of American housing preferences.94 
In fact, where his table predicted that only 
62 percent of Americans would want to live 
in single-family homes—and most of those 
on tiny lots—the surveys he used to reach 
this conclusion almost uniformly found 
that 75 to 85 percent of Americans prefer or 
aspire to live in single-family homes.95 
Second, a critic writing in the very same 
journal warned that the surveys Nelson used 
“may not be terribly reliable,” partly because 
they were not random and partly because 
“people often do not behave in ways that are 
consistent with the preferences or opinions 
they express.”96 Random surveys and peo-
ple’s actual behavior both reveal exactly the 
opposite of what Nelson predicts.
Indeed, the Wall Street Journal and Wash-
ington Post were exactly wrong: between 2000 
and 2010, a million baby boomers moved 
out from inner cities into suburbs or smaller 
towns.97 (The Journal has since published a 
retraction.) In virtually every demographic, 
population growth in the suburbs is faster 
than in inner cities. Reports of inner-city 
growth are mostly anecdotal and often in-
volve government-subsidized housing proj-
ects.
Random surveys also suggest that millen-
nials and other young people are not as eager 
to spend their lives in dense housing devel-
opments as Nelson suggests. A 2011 survey 
of more than 2,000 “likely voters” commis-
sioned by the National Association of Home 
Builders, whose constituency has a strong in-
terest in having accurate information about 
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future housing demand, found that 92 per-
cent of people in the 25–34 age bracket and 
85 percent of people in the 18–24 age bracket 
hope to eventually own their own home.98 
Similarly, a 2012 survey of more than 1,000 
18- to 35-year-olds commissioned by Better 
Homes Real Estate found that 75 percent as-
pire to own their own home.99 Neither survey 
specifically mentioned single-family homes, 
but since about 17 out of 20 single-family 
homes are owner-occupied while about 17 
out of 20 multifamily homes are renter-oc-
cupied, it is likely that most of these aspiring 
homeowners seek single-family houses.
Nelson and other planners who believe 
that single-family homes will soon be passé 
are guilty of a logical fallacy. Most house-
holds in multifamily housing lack children, 
so they assume that most households that 
lack children prefer multifamily. In fact, 
only a minority of all childless households 
live in multifamily housing, and many of 
those who do live there would choose single-
family housing if they could afford it.
Nelson’s analysis of California housing 
supply and demand betrays a profound lack 
of understanding of the simplest of eco-
nomic principles. He observes that Califor-
nia housing prices have been higher than 
in the rest of the country (which he fails 
to note is the result of restrictive planning) 
and that this has depressed homeownership 
rates. He concludes from this that tastes are 
changing and people in general, and Cali-
fornians in particular, are less interested in 
owning homes.100 
Based on these and similar considerations, 
he predicted specific homeownership rates 
and the “demand” for single-family and mul-
tifamily housing in each of several California 
metropolitan areas. For example, he predicted 
that the 2035 demand for single-family hous-
ing in the San Francisco Bay Area will be for 
1.3 million homes while multifamily hous-
ing (including attached townhouses) will be 
2.4 million homes.101 Plan Bay Area planners 
cited these numbers to justify their policy of 
subsidizing new multifamily housing while 
restricting new single-family houses.102
The problem with Nelson’s analysis is 
that demand is never a fixed number; instead, 
it is a correspondence between prices and 
quantities. Given a choice between $600,000 
for a single-family home and $400,000 for a 
unit of a multifamily condominium, which 
are typical prices in the San Francisco Bay 
Area today, many people will not be able to 
afford the single-family home. But given the 
opportunity to buy a single-family home for 
under $100,000, or a new, 2,200-square-foot 
home for under $200,000, which are typical 
prices in Houston today, more people will 
choose single-family homes.
In short, at higher prices, people will 
consume lower quantities of housing and 
will be more likely to choose multifamily 
homes; at lower prices, they will consume 
higher quantities and will be more likely to 
choose single-family homes. Nelson, how-
ever, makes no reference to price in his pro-
jections of demand, effectively dismissing it 
as an issue. Past California plans have made 
housing expensive, depressing the quantity 
of single-family homes people could afford 
to buy. Plan Bay Area will make them more 
expensive, but Nelson misinterprets peoples’ 
response to these artificially high prices as 
changes in taste.
How It Should Be Done
Advocates of government planning of ur-
ban areas argue that planners can follow a 
multi-step rational planning process:
 ● First, they identify a goal or possibly 
alternative goals. 
 ● Second, they identify a number of 
projects or policies that can help meet 
that goal or goals. 
 ● Next, they estimate the costs of each 
project/policy and the benefits each 
will produce measured either in dol-
lars or, if no dollar figures can be at-
tributed to the benefits, in some other 
quantitative measure such as, in the 
case of greenhouse gases, tons of car-
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bon dioxide-equivalent gases abated. If 
there is more than one goal (for exam-
ple, congestion reduction or housing 
affordability), this estimation should 
be made for each goal.
 ● These data allow planners to calculate 
either a benefit-cost ratio or a cost per 
unit of benefit ratio for each project/
policy. 
 ● Planners would then package a plan 
by selecting the projects/policies that 
have the highest benefit-cost ratios or 
lowest costs per unit of benefit. If there 
is more than one goal, a separate alter-
native can be prepared for each goal.
 ● Given several alternatives, planners can 
try to design a preferred alternative 
that comes closest to meeting all the 
goals.
Sustainability plans such as Plan Bay Area 
violate this process in several ways. Many of 
the plans start out with a predetermined set 
of projects or polices, such as rail transit and 
densification. Given that predetermination, 
they don’t bother to compare the benefits 
and costs of the various projects. Instead of 
identifying several contrasting alternatives 
that might meet different goals, such as re-
ducing emissions versus making housing 
more affordable, they cloak their predeter-
mination by developing several alternatives 
that, in fact, are just slightly different ways 
of implementing the same policies as the 
preferred alternative.
The rational planning process that is 
taught in planning schools ultimately fails 
because cities and urban areas are too com-
plex to plan. This leaves plans susceptible to 
political and technical manipulation, thus 
subverting the rational goals of planning. 
Plan Bay Area is a prime example: when 
asked why planners did not account for the 
latest fuel-economy standards, which would 
allow the region to meet SB 375’s green-
house gas emissions targets without any 
land-use regulation, planners said they were 
not legally allowed to consider those stan-
dards in determining whether an alternative 
can achieve SB 375’s goals.103 While not ev-
eryone agrees with that legal interpretation, 
the point is that planners allowed political 
considerations to override reality.
Sustainability planning represents a threat 
to the dreams and aspirations of Americans 
who want to own their own homes and to 
enjoy the mobility provided by the automo-
bile. The fact that the authors of these plans 
rarely, if ever, consider the cost-effectiveness 
of their actions shows that their real goals are 
not to reduce greenhouse gas emissions but 
to enforce their ideological belief that high-
density cities are somehow superior to low-
density suburbs. City leaders often go along 
with this in order to gain power over the sub-
urbs, whose residents don’t pay taxes to the 
central cities.
Far from promoting “livability”—another 
buzzword that is often tied with “sustainabil-
ity”—sustainability plans will significantly 
reduce the quality of life of urban Americans. 
Few people sincerely believe that dedicating 
40 to 50 percent of their incomes to live in an 
1,100-square-foot apartment or condomini-
um is superior to spending just 25 percent of 
their incomes on a 2,200-square-foot single-
family home. Those who do believe it are free 
to do so, as homebuilders will gladly build 
for any market. But they have no right to 
impose their belief on others in a misguided 
attempt to reduce the environmental effects 
of urban life.
Congress should kill the “livability” pro-
gram that the Obama administration is 
using to promote sustainability planning. 
California and other states should repeal 
the laws that mandate such planning. To 
the extent that greenhouse gas emissions are 
a real problem, the problem should be ad-
dressed by ensuring that any reductions in 
such emissions are achieved in the most cost- 
effective ways possible.
19
Notes
1. Draft Plan Bay Area: Strategy for a Sustainable 
Region (Oakland: Association of Bay Area Govern-
ments & Metropolitan Transportation Commis-
sion, 2013), p. 26.
2. George B. Dantzig and Thomas L Saaty, 
Compact City: A Plan for a Livable Urban Environ-
ment (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1973), p. 82.
3. Dantzig and Saaty, Compact City, p. 83.
4. Dantzig and Saaty, Compact City, pp. 129–
130.
5. United States Congress, Compact Cities: A Ne-
glected Way of Conserving Energy: Joint Hearings before 
the Subcommittee on the City of the Committee on Bank-
ing, Finance, and Urban Affairs and the Subcommittee 
on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session, 
December 11 and 12, 1979 (Washington: GPO, 
1981).
6. Boris S. Pushkarev and Jeffrey M. Zupan, 
Public Transport and Land Use Policy (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1977), pp. 5–7.
7. Peter Newman and Jeffrey Kenworthy, “Gaso-
line Consumption and Cities,” Journal of the Ameri-
can Planning Association (Winter 1989): 24–37.
8. Randal O’Toole, “Does Rail Transit Save 
Energy or Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions?” 
Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 615, April 14, 
2008, p. 4.
9. Peter Calthorpe, Michael Corbett, Andres 
Duany, Elizabeth Moule, Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, 
and Stefanos Polyzoides, “Ahwahnee Principles 
for Resource-Efficient Communities” (1991), 
www.lgc.org/ahwahnee/principles.html.
10. Quoted in James Kunstler, The Geography 
of Nowhere: The Rise and Decline of America’s Man-
Made Landscape (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1993), p. 255.
11. “The LUTRAQ Alternative,” 1000 Friends of 
Oregon, Portland (1992), p. 1.
12. Agenda 21 (New York: United Nations, 1992), 
7.5.2(a) through (c), p. 56.
13. Genevieve Giuliano, ‘‘The Weakening Trans-
portation-Land Use Connection,’’ Access 6 (1995): 
3–11.
14. Ibid.
15. Michael Breheny, “The Compact City and 
Transport Energy Consumption,” Transactions of 
the Institute of British Geographers 20, no. 1 (1995): 
81–101.
16. Marlon G. Boarnet and Sharon Sarmiento, 
“Can Land Use Policy Really Affect Travel Be-
havior? A Study of the Link between Non-Work 
Travel and Land Use Characteristics,” Urban 
Studies 35, no. 7 (June 1998): 1155–69.
17. Randall Crane and Richard Crepeau “Does 
Neighborhood Design Influence Travel? A Be-
havioral Analysis of Travel Diary and GIS Data,” 
Transportation Research D: Transport and Environ-
ment 3, no. 4 (1998): 225–38.
18. Jeffrey R. Kenworthy and Felix B. Laube, An 
International Sourcebook of Automobile Dependence 
in Cities 1960–1990 (Boulder, CO: University of 
Colorado, 1999).
19. See, for example, Peter Newman and Jeffrey 
Kenworthy, “Costs of Automobile Dependence: 
Global Survey of Cities,” Transportation Research 
Record 1670, pp. 17–26; and John Holtzclaw, Rob-
ert Clear, Hank Dittmar, David Goldstein, and 
Peter Haas, “Location Efficiency: Neighborhood 
and Socio-economic Characteristics Determine 
Auto Ownership and Use—Studies in Chicago, 
Los Angeles, and San Francisco,” Transportation 
Planning and Technology 25 (2002): 1–27.
20. David Brownstone, “Key Relationships be-
tween the Built Environment and VMT,” Trans-
portation Research Board (2008), p. 7, tinyurl.
com/y9mro58.
21. Senate Bill 375, §1(c).
22. “Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” chapter 14, 
laws of 2008, §8(1)(c).
23. Florida House Bill 697, effective July 1, 2008, 
ch. 2008-191.
24. Jeffrey I. Chapman, “Proposition 13: Some 
Unintended Consequences,” Public Policy Insti-
tute of California (2006), pp. 11–12.
25. Draft Plan Bay Area, p. 101.
26. Draft Plan Bay Area, p. 26.
27. Plan Bay Area Draft Environmental Impact 
Report (Oakland, CA: Association of Bay Area 
Governments and Metropolitan Transportation 
Commission, 2013), Table 3.1-7.
28. California Assembly Bill 32, “Global Warm-
ing Solutions Act,” 2006.
20
29. “AB 32 Scoping Plan, California Air Re-
source Board, 2013, tinyurl.com/4yjwlmx.
30. “ARB Proposes Regulations to Accept Fed-
eral GHG Vehicle Standards,” California Air Re-
sources Board, August 30, 2012.
31. Plan Bay Area DEIR, pp. 2.2-18–2.2-19.
32. Plan Bay Area DEIR, Table 3.1-29, “Scoping 
Plan Reductions.”
33. Ibid., “MTC Climate Policy Initiative.”
34. Plan Bay Area DEIR, Table 3.1-12, shows that 
the plan reduces per capita driving by 5.8 percent. 
Table 3.1-29 says that vehicles in 2040 will pro-
duce 20.8 million tons of greenhouse gases under 
the proposed plan. Without the 5.8 percent re-
duction in per capita driving, vehicles would emit 
1.28 million tons more.
35. Plan Bay Area DEIR, Table 3.1-29.
36. Calculated assuming new cars meet the stan-
dards through a straight-line improvement in 
fuel economy; no improvements are made after 
the standards are reached in 2016 under the old 
standard and 2025 under the new; and that the 
American automobile fleet turns over at its his-
toric rate of 5.5 percent per year.
37. “Key Findings: 2012–2013 INRIX Traffic 
Scorecard Annual Report,” INRIX, 2013, www.
inrix.com/scorecard/summary.asp.
38. “National List of All 2010 Urbanized Areas,” 
Census Bureau, 2013, www2.census.gov/geo/ua/
ua_list_ua.xls.
39. David Schrank, Bill Eisele, and Tim Lomax, 
TTI’s 2012 Urban Mobility Report (College Station: 
Texas A&M University, 2013), “Complete Data” 
spreadsheet.
40. 2011 National Transit Database (Washington: 
Federal Transit Administration, 2012), “Capital 
Use,” “Operating Expense,” and “Service” spread-
sheets.
41. Costs from “National Income and Products 
Accounts Tables,” Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
Table 2.5.5, “Personal Consumption Expendi-
tures by Function,” lines 54 (motor vehicles), 57 
(motor vehicle operation), and 116 (net motor ve-
hicle insurance); vehicle miles of travel from High-
way Statistics 2011 (Washington: Federal Highway 
Administration, 2013), Table VM-1, light-duty 
vehicles only; highway subsidies from Highway 
Statistics 2011, table HF-10, lines 16 plus 17 plus 
32.
42. Adella Santos, Nancy McGuckin, Hikari Na-
kmoto, Danielle Gray, and Susan Liss, Summary 
of Travel Trends: 2009 National Household Transpor-
tation Survey (Washington: Federal Highway Ad-
ministration, 2011), Table 16.
43. Highway Statistics 1989 (Washington: Federal 
Highway Administration, 1990), Table HM-72.
44. Highway Statistics 2010 (Washington: Federal 
Highway Administration, 2012), Table HM-71.
45. 1982 National Transit Database (Washington: 
Federal Transit Administration, 1983), Table 
417282; 2010 National Transit Database, “service” 
spreadsheet.
46. 1980 data from General Social and Economic 
Characteristics: California (Washington: Census 
Bureau, 1983), Table 118; 2010 data from 2010 
American Community Survey, factfinder2.census.
gov, Table B08301 for urbanized areas.
47. Plan Bay Area DEIR, page 1.2-51.
48. Draft Plan Bay Area, p. 102.
49. Schrank, et al., 2012 Urban Mobility Report, 
“Complete Data” spreadsheet.
50. Plan Bay Area Final Environmental Impact Re-
port (Oakland: Association of Bay Area Govern-
ments and Metropolitan Transportation Com-
mission, 2013), p. 3.7-96.
51. United Nations General Assembly, Report of 
the World Commission on Environment and Develop-
ment: Our Common Future. Transmitted to the General 
Assembly as an Annex to document A/42/427 - Devel-
opment and International Co-operation: Environment 
(1987). 
52. Herman E. Daly, Steady-State Economics: Sec-
ond Edition with New Essays (Covelo, CA: Island 
Press, 1991), p. 4.
53. “Transect Applied to Regional Plans,” Bet-
ter Cities & Towns, September, 2000, p. 1, tinyurl.
com/lu76wwo.
54. Department of Land Conservation and De-
velopment, Using Income Criteria to Protect Com-
mercial Farmland in the State of Oregon (Salem, OR: 
DLCD, 1998), p. 2.
55. House Bill 2815, §8(1)(c), chapter 14, State of 
Washington laws of 2008, tinyurl.com/l62pmxs.
56. Willis Eschenbach, “Pump Price, Miles Driv-
en, and Energy Taxes,” Watts Up With That? July 9, 
2013, tinyurl.com/mpg6ydl.
21
57. Reid Ewing, Keith Bartholomew, Steve Win-
kelman, Jerry Walters, and Don Chen, Growing 
Cooler: The Evidence on Urban Development and Cli-
mate Change (Washington: Urban Land Institute, 
2008), p. 2.
58. Environmental Protection Agency, Inventory 
of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990–
2010 (April 15, 2012), Tables ES-2 and 2-15.
59. Reducing U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions: How 
Much at What Cost? (Washington: McKinsey, 2008), 
pp. ix, xiii.
60. Calculated by assuming new standards will 
be met on a straight-line basis from 2010’s aver-
age for light-duty, short-wheelbase vehicles of 
23.3 mpg, that no improvements will be made 
after 2025, and that the American auto fleet will 
continue to turn over at the rate of one-eigh-
teenth per year. The 2010 average of 23.3 mpg is 
from Monthly Energy Review: July 2013 (Washing-
ton: Energy Information Administration, 2013), 
p. 17.
61. Andreas Schäfer, John B. Heywood, Henry 
D. Jacoby, and Ian A. Waitz, Transportation in a 
Climate-Constrained World (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2009), pp. 132–33.
62. Matthew Barth and Kanok Boriboonsom-
sin, “Traffic Congestion and Greenhouse Gases,” 
Access (Fall 2009), pp. 2–9.
63. Highway Statistics 2011 (Washington: Federal 
Highway Administration, 2013), Table VM-2.
64. “Traffic Signal Timing,” Institute of Trans-
portation Engineers, 2013, ite.org/signal/index.
asp.
65. Nidhi Kalra, et al., Reference Sourcebook for Re-
ducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Transportation 
Sources (Washington: Federal Highway Adminis-
tration, 2012), p.107.
66. Dom Nozzi, “Congestion Is Our Friend,” 
Gainesville Sun, February 10, 2008, tinyurl.com/
ml29477; Alex Pearlstein, “Vancouver to Atlanta: 
‘Congestion Is Our Friend,’” Planetizen, May 30, 
2007, planetizen.com/nod/24723; Yule Heibel, 
“Congestion Is Our Friend,” Yule Heibel’s Post Stu-
dio, April 8, 2010, tinyurl.com/l2u2svm.
67. Ewing, et al., Growing Cooler, p. 2.
68. Terry Dinan and David Austin, “How Would 
Proposed Fuel Economy Standards Affect the 
Highway Trust Fund?” Congressional Budget 
Office, 2012, p. 6.
69. House Bill 2815, §8(1), chapter 14, laws of 
2008, tinyurl.com/l62pmxs.
70. 2011 National Transit Database (Washington: 
Federal Transit Administration, 2012), “Capital 
Use,” “Operating Expense,” and “Service” spread-
sheets.
71. Costs from “National Income and Products 
Accounts Tables,” Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
Table 2.5.5, “Personal Consumption Expendi-
tures by Function,” lines 54 (motor vehicles), 57 
(motor vehicle operation), and 116 (net motor ve-
hicle insurance); vehicle miles of travel from High-
way Statistics 2011 (Washington: Federal Highway 
Administration, 2013), Table VM-1, light-duty 
vehicles only; highway subsidies from Highway 
Statistics 2011, Table HF-10, lines 16 plus 17 plus 
32.
72. Adella Santos, Nancy McGuckin, Hikari Na-
kmoto, Danielle Gray, and Susan Liss, Summary 
of Travel Trends: 2009 National Household Transpor-
tation Survey (Washington: Federal Highway Ad-
ministration, 2011), Table 16.
73. Rémy Prud’homme and Chang-Woon Lee, 
“Size, Sprawl, Speed and the Efficiency of Cities,” 
Urban Studies 36, no. 11 (October 1999): 1849–58.
74. Panorama of Transport: 2009 Edition (Luxem-
bourg: Eurostat, 2009), p. 100.
75. The 23.3 mpg for light-duty, short-wheel-
base vehicles is from Monthly Energy Review: July 
2013 (Washington: Energy Information Adminis-
tration, 2013), p. 17; the 1.67 people per vehicle 
is from Santos, et al., Summary of Travel Trends, 
Table 16.
76. Burning one gallon of gasoline emits 8,887 
grams of carbon dioxide; Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from a Typical Passenger Vehicle, Environmental 
Protection Agency (2012), p. 1.
77. Calculated from the 2010 National Transit Da-
tabase, “Energy Use” and “Service” spreadsheets.
78. David Brownstone, “Key Relationships be-
tween the Built Environment and VMT,” Trans-
portation Research Board, 2008, p. 1, tinyurl.
com/y9mro58.
79. Driving and the Built Environment: The Effects 
of Compact Development on Motorized Travel, Energy 
Use, and carbon dioxide Emissions (Washington: Na-
tional Research Council, 2009), p. 2.
80. Highway Statistics 2000 (Washington: Federal 
Highway Administration, 2001), Table HM-72.
81. Elizabeth Kneebone, “Job Sprawl Stalls: The 
Great Recession and Metropolitan Employment 
22
Location,” Brookings Institution (2013), pp. 1, 8, 
17.
82. Highway Statistics 2010 (Washington: Federal 
Highway Administration, 2012), Table HM-71.
83. “Shape Lafayette. Show Up and Vote,” La-
fayette Consolidated Government, 2013, planla 
fayette.com/assets/Four-Growth-Scenarios-Flyer.
pdf.
84. Sustainability Planning Toolkit (Oakland, CA: 
ICLEI, 2009), p. 8.
85. “U.S. Local Sustainability Plans and Climate 
Action Plans,” ICLEI, 2009, pp. 1, 3, 6.
86. Sustainable Northampton Comprehensive Plan 
(Northampton, MA: City of Northampton, 2008), 
p. 1.
87. Sustainable Salt Lake Plan 2015 (Salt Lake City: 
City of Salt Lake City, 2013), pp. 3, 21.
88. O’Toole, “Does Rail Transit Save Energy or 
Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions?”, p. 14.
89. “The Role of Federal Highway Administra-
tion Programs in Livability: State of the Practice 
Summary,” Federal Highway Administration, 
2011, p. 4, tinyurl.com/ppkjf97.
90. “FHWA/FTA Planning Program Funds to 
Support Integration of Transportation, Land 
Use, and Climate Change,” Federal Highway Ad-
ministration, 2008, tinyurl.com/oczl8w5.
91. “Handbook for Estimating Transportation 
Greenhouse Gases for Integration into the Plan-
ning Process,” Federal Highway Administration, 
2013, p. 104, tinyurl.com/ptqcn23.
92. Nancy Keates, “Hip, Urban, Middle-Aged: 
Baby Boomers Are Moving into Trendy Urban 
Neighborhoods,” Wall Street Journal, August 8, 
2013, tinyurl.com/md6ongx; Tara Bahrampour, 
“With the Kids Gone, Aging Baby Boomers Opt 
for City Life,” Washington Post, August 9, 2013, 
tinyurl.com/m3883za.
93. Arthur C. Nelson, “Leadership in a New Era,” 
Journal of the American Planning 72, no. 4 (Autumn 
2006): 393–407.
94. Ibid., Table 4, p. 397.
95. Dowell Myers and Elizabeth Gearin, “Cur-
rent Preferences and Future Demand for Denser 
Residential Environments,” Housing Policy De-
bate 12, no. 4 (2001): 633–59.
96. Emil Malizia, “Comment on ‘Planning Lead-
ership in a New Era,’” Journal of the American Plan-
ning 72, no. 4 (Autumn 2006): 407–09.
97. Wendell Cox, “Urban Core Boomer Popula-
tions Drop 1 Million 2000–2010,” New Geogra-
phy, September 11, 2013, tinyurl.com/lnohbss.
98. Neil Newhouse and Robert Blizzard, NAHB 
National Survey, National Association of Home 
Builders (2012), p. 19.
99. “Next Generation of Homebuyers Are 
Knowledgeable, Responsible and Savvy According 
to New Better Homes and Gardens Real Estate 
Survey,” Better Homes and Gardens Real Estate, 
2012, p. 1.
100. Arthur C. Nelson, The New California Dream: 
How Demographic and Economic Trends May Shape 
the Housing Market—A Land Use Scenario for 2020 and 
2035 (Washington: Urban Land Institute, 2011), 
pp. 21–22.
101. Ibid., p. 44.
102. Plan Bay Area DEIR, p. 2.3-5.
103. Plan Bay Area FEIR, p. 3.5-32.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS FROM THE CATO INSTITUTE
Humanity Unbound: How Fossil Fuels Saved Humanity from Nature and Nature 
from Humanity by Indur M. Goklany, Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 715 (December 
20, 2012)
Scientific Misconduct: The Manipulation of Evidence for Political Advocacy in 
Health Care and Climate Policy by George Avery, Cato Institute Briefing Paper no. 117 
(February 8, 2010)
Three Decades of Politics and Failed Policies at HUD by Tad DeHaven, Cato 
Institute Policy Analysis no. 655 (November 23, 2009)
The Myth of the Compact City: Why Compact Development Is Not the Way to 
Reduce Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Randal O’Toole, Cato Institute Policy Analysis 
no. 653 (November 18, 2009)
Why Sustainability Standards for Biofuel Production Make Little Economic Sense 
by Harry de Gorter and David R. Just, Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 647 (October 7, 
2009)
How Urban Planners Caused the Housing Bubble by Randal O’Toole, Cato Institute 
Policy Analysis no. 646 (October 1, 2009)
A Federal Renewable Electricity Requirement: What’s Not to Like? by Robert J. 
Michaels, Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 627 (November 13, 2008)
Dismal Science: The Shortcomings of U.S. School Choice Research and How to 
Address Them by John Merrifield, Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 616 (April 16, 
2008)
What to Do about Climate Change by Indur M. Goklany, Cato Institute Policy 
Analysis no. 609 (February 5, 2008)
The Planning Tax: The Case against Regional Growth-Management Planning by 
Randal O’Toole, Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 606 (December 6, 2007)
Critiquing Sprawl’s Critics by Peter Gordon and Harry W. Richardson, Cato Institute 
Policy Analysis no. 365 (January 24, 2000)
Smart Growth at the Federal Trough: EPA’s Financing of the Anti-Sprawl 
Movement by Peter Samuel and Randal O’Toole, Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 361 
(November 24, 1999)
PA Masthead cmyk.indd   2 8/9/06   4:53:16 PM
RECENT STUDIES IN THE  
CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS SERIES
739.  Antitrust Enforcement in the Obama Administration’s First Term: A 
Regulatory Approach by William F. Shughart II and Diana W. Thomas 
(October 22, 2013)
738.  SNAP Failure: The Food Stamp Program Needs Reform by Michael Tanner 
(October 16, 2013)
737. Why Growth Is Getting Harder by Brink Lindsey (October 8, 2013)
736.  The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act: Time to End the Corporate Welfare by 
Robert J. Rhee (September 10, 2013)
735.  Reversing Worrisome Trends: How to Attract and Retain Investment in a 
Competitive Global Economy by Daniel Ikenson (August 22, 2013)
734.  Arms and Influence in Syria: The Pitfalls of Greater U.S. Involvement by 
Erica D. Borghard (August 7, 2013)
733.  The Rising Cost of Social Security Disability Insurance by Tad DeHaven 
(August 6, 2013)
732.  Building a Wall around the Welfare State, Instead of the Country by Alex 
Nowrasteh (July 25, 2013)
731.  High Frequency Trading: Do Regulators Need to Control this Tool of 
Informationally Efficient Markets? by Holly A. Bell (July 22, 2013)
730.   Liberalization or Litigation? Time to Rethink the International Investment 
Regime by Simon Lester (July 8, 2013)
729.   The Rise and Fall of the Gold Standard in the United States by George Selgin 
(June 20, 2013)
728.   Recent Arguments against the Gold Standard by Lawrence H. White (June 20, 
2013)
727.  “Paint Is Cheaper Than Rails”: Why Congress Should Abolish New Starts 
by Randal O’Toole (June 19, 2013)
